English Channel surveillance used ‘to deter and punish migrants’

Current capabilities

Apart from drones, which are often equipped with a wide range of other technologies, such as synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and automatic identification system (AIS) receivers, UK authorities also have access to an array of other capabilities.

This includes the use of various surveillance satellites, such as those supplied by Airbus or Horizon Technologies, which can be supplemented with AI-powered algorithms to further help detect and identify vessels.

The data from these satellites is shared widely within the UK’s border control ecosystem, including with multi-agency bodies such as the JMSC and the NMIC, which also encompass organisations like the Royal Navy, National Crime Agency and Scotland Yard’s counter-terrorism branch. 

Again, these technologies and the data they produce are often advertised as a way of monitoring, and countering, migrant crossings in the Channel.

Other surveillance efforts include use of the UK Border Agency’s boats for patrols, and flyovers with helicopters or planes.

This is not to mention the various surveillance technologies deployed in ports on both sides of the Channel, as well as the technologies deployed separately by France and Frontex, the European Union’s border and coastguard agency.

While there are limits to the use of these technologies and techniques – for example, due to weather conditions, poor image resolution or the high cost of operation – the UK government is set to ramp up maritime surveillance of the Channel even further over the coming year.

Technologically enabled deterrence

Matthew Rycroft, permanent secretary at the Home Office, told the Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee on 2 February 2022: “The overarching intent of government strategy is deterrence – we want to deter people from making what is a dangerous journey, in order to save lives. That is a shared humanitarian responsibility [with France].”

Home secretary Patel, during the same session, confirmed that although 28,000 migrants had crossed the Channel in 2021, a further 23,000 were prevented. “In terms of prevention, there is a lot of activity taking place,” she said.

Asked what safe routes currently exist for people attempting to cross the Channel, Patel could not give a clear answer, but said: “We should be very clear about this, that the majority of people are not fleeing persecution. They are asylum shopping.”

However, a Court of Appeals judgment from December 2021 – which Patel and Rycroft confirmed they were aware of – specifically ruled that “an asylum seeker who merely attempts to arrive at the frontiers of the UK in order to make a claim is not entering or attempting to enter the country unlawfully”.

It should also be noted that, despite this judgment, the government is currently drawing up plans to detain every single male migrant who crosses the Channel in a small boat.

The focus on deterrence is not new. In a video posted by the Home Office Twitter account in September 2020, it was made clear that drones are being used to gather footage in support of prosecutions, with clandestine channel threat commander Dan O’Mahoney saying that the surveillance footage “has been absolutely critical in securing convictions”.

O’Mahoney added: “The message I want to deliver today is that every single one of these small boats has to be driven by somebody, and if that person is you, you can expect to be arrested on your arrival in the UK and locked up in prison for a sizeable jail term.”

The video itself shows footage of drones taxiing the runway at Lydd airport, with accompanying text saying: “We have more surveillance of the Channel than ever before. It’s helping to protect lives and bring people smugglers to justice as we continue our work to make the small boats route unviable.”

Maddie Harris, founder of the Humans for Rights Network (HFRN), an organisation that helps migrants to document human rights violations committed against them – tells Computer Weekly that, in her experience, the use of technology in the Channel is about “trying to connect people to some form of criminal activity, when in fact these are just individuals who are making a dangerous journey”.

She adds the primary motivation for British authorities is deterrence, and that criminalisation attempts are part of a wider effort to extend the hostile environment.

“We’ve met people who they have attempted to criminalise [for smuggling on the basis that they were driving the boat],” says Harris. “One particular individual, for example, said ‘I was a fisherman in my country, I was the only person on the boat who had any experience being at sea, of course I was going to try and save my life and the lives of everybody else on that boat’. An image of somebody steering a boat does not confirm that person is aiding ‘illegal immigration’.”

She adds that although authorities may suggest they do not have the capacity to rescue and/or intercept every person or every vessel attempting to make the crossing, there is nothing happening to increase search-and-rescue capacity.

“They are allowing these situations to happen, they are allowing people to die because the focus is on a deterrent as opposed to it being on the appropriate use of resources and technology to save people’s lives,” says Harris.

“Not to mention the lack of legal routes, which is what is leading people to make these journeys in the first place. There’s as much money as they want to militarise and secure the border, but there’s no money to treat people with dignity and respect in terms of how they’re accommodated, or to facilitate safe and legal passage to the UK.”

The Home Office was unable to answer questions on search-and-rescue capacity in the Channel, instead directing Computer Weekly to the MCA.

Lack of awareness

Computer Weekly pressed the Home Office on its lack of awareness about measures being taken to increase search and rescue capacity, but received no further correspondence.

In response to Computer Weekly’s questions about what measures are being taken to increase search-and-rescue capacity in the Channel, the MCA said: “The MCA is always looking at ways to support and strengthen the search-and-rescue capability and capacity of its search and rescue arm, HM Coastguard, through ongoing investment into the provision of lifesaving resources and new technology.

“These resources include helicopters, state-of-the-art radio networks and advanced computer systems.”

Asked what barriers remain to staging successful search-and-rescue operations in the Channel, the MCA said it “has sufficient search-and-rescue assets to provide effective search-and-rescue operations in the UK search-and-rescue region”.

It added: “There are numerous factors which can affect the success of a search-and-rescue operation – many of which are outside the direct control of HM Coastguard – such as weather conditions, survivability time, the ability of those in distress to raise the alarm and effectively communicate and indicate their position, and the carriage of suitable lifesaving equipment and training.”

The increasing use of technology both in the Channel and at border entry points is also, according to those Computer Weekly spoke with, pushing people into more and more dangerous situations.

Minnie Rahman, campaigns director at the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), says that rather than introduce processes such as asylum visas that would allow people seeking refuge to travel safely like everyone else, the UK government has instead shut down the few safe routes that existed in favour of doubling down on border security.

“This security has done nothing to prevent risky crossings or save lives – sadly, we’ve only seen the routes people take to get here become more and more dangerous,” says Rahman. “Just two months ago, despite increased border surveillance, we saw the deadliest Channel tragedy on record, with at least 27 people losing their lives after trying, but failing, to get help from British or French authorities.

“Our government knows that its border technology does not protect people. Just two years ago, its own assessment [by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which Patel was part of at the time] concluded that policies ‘focused exclusively on closing borders, driving migrants to take more dangerous routes’.”

This assessment also says: “The UK should address the wider, interlinked factors driving irregular migration – including climate change, conflict, repressive governance and corruption – rather than focusing narrowly on reducing the numbers reaching Europe’s borders in the short term.”

Rahman says the current ramping-up of technology and security at the border is being used as an opportunity to deflect attention away from the government’s own failings and court headlines about being “tough on migration”. “If the government truly cared about people’s safety, they would start introducing safe routes for people forced to move, instead of wasting money on pointless and dangerous border technology,” she adds.

In the context of the English Channel, both UK and French authorities have deployed a wide range of technologies that make safer routes via ports much harder to complete. These include X-ray monitors, motion sensors, carbon dioxide detectors (to detect people’s breath), and heart-rate monitors.

“There is this misguided idea that if we make the border sharper and harder – put up more walls, put up more drones – then people are just going to stop coming, but nothing could be further from the truth,” says Molnar. “People are in desperate situations and, if anything, they are going to take more dangerous routes.”

Given the extensive surveillance capabilities available to authorities monitoring the Channel, Molnar adds that while they may not be aware of every crossing, border authorities are absolutely aware of the wider situation in the Channel, and continue choosing to deploy technology in a certain way.

“The idea is to make it as difficult as possible for people to cross, and also then to act as a deterrent for others not to come,” she says, adding that many people still wrongly assume that tech is somehow neutral.

“Nothing could be further from the truth. Tech is extremely political and it actually replicates the power differentials in our world. We know that the state has the ability to prevent people drowning in the sea, and yet they choose to not use this tech for these purposes.”

Asked whether it was prioritising deterrence over saving people’s lives, the Home Office said it does not comment on security arrangements for operational reasons.

Logics of exclusion

According to Molnar, the decision-making behind how technology is deployed in the English Channel is underpinned by “logics of exclusion”, which have historically derived from the global power differentials created by “capitalism, colonialism and imperialism”.

She adds: “None of this is new – we’re always talking about a power differential between a really powerful entity like a state using surveillance and technology on communities that have historically been made marginalised, and re-marginalised.

“It’s just now states have different tools to try and enforce a harder, sharper border regime against people who have an internationally protected right to seek asylum.”

Molnar says the proliferation of these migration management technologies has facilitated a turn towards “techno-solutionism”, which is the idea that technology can be deployed to solve a range of complex social and political issues, which from the perspective of the UK state includes controlling its borders.

Expanding on this point, Antonella Napolitano, senior policy officer and network coordinator at Privacy International, says: “The moment you start framing people as a problem, you’re dehumaninsing them.” She says this is exacerbated by the turn to techno-solutionism and the reduction of human beings to pixels on the screen of a drone or satellite operator.

“The problem is not the people, the problem is the causes of migration, so if you’re looking at the actual problems, technology is not the solution,” says Napolitano.

It should be noted that while politicians will often attempt to divide migrants into different, one-dimensional categories – such as “climate refugees”, “economic migrants” or asylum seekers – the reality is more complex.

For example, according to a House of Lords testimony from Caroline Zickgraf, deputy director of the Hugo Observatory, “migration is always multi-causal – it is always a combination of social, political, economic, environmental and demographic factors”.

The techno-solutionism of modern states, in combination with the logics of exclusion they adhere to, therefore means technology is ultimately being deployed as a deterrent against migrant crossings, rather than as a means of protecting them or of solving the complex range of problems that force people to migrate in the first place.

All the people Computer Weekly spoke to stressed the need for safe routes into the UK to be established as quickly as possible.

Secrecy in public-private partnerships

For Eliot Bendinelli, a technologist at Privacy International, while many of the technologies being used are advertised as being great for rescue missions and having real-time information-sharing capabilities, UK authorities are simply not using them for these purposes.

“In theory, that could be used to save people, but in practice that’s not what we’re seeing at all,” he says. “Is that because they haven’t equipped this drone with the necessary technology? Is it because actually the time and resources required to run this drone are much higher than expected and it’s not flying as often as it should? Or is it because that’s not how they want to use these drones?”

Bendinelli, who also describes the use of tech in the Channel as a “political choice”, says it can be difficult to hold UK authorities accountable because of the lack of transparency around exactly what technologies are being used and when.

He says the public information put out by the government often boasts about its tech investments and procurement, and how these capabilities will enable it to detect any potential Channel crossings, but upon closer inspection “there is a lack of information” about the extent and success of the surveillance.

He says this could mean two things: “Either they’re stamping secret national security labels on it so nobody knows how it works, claiming it is because otherwise, people are going to find ways to circumvent it, but it could also just be that it’s not as effective as they’re trying to make it and the secrecy around it is a useful blanket to avoid criticism.”

Bendinelli adds: “I think the lack of transparency prevents us from getting answers to these questions.”

A February 2021 report from Privacy International, The UK’s privatised migration surveillance regime, shows that private technology firms involved in developing and maintaining a range of digital surveillance tools for UK immigration authorities are rarely scrutinised or held accountable for their involvement in the border regime.

The report, which is based entirely on open source information, notes that “many of the key actors involved are resistant to transparency”, and that the general secrecy surrounding the Home Office’s technology ecosystem means that the companies involved “enjoy minimal scrutiny and are seldom held accountable”.

Speaking at a launch event for the report, Privacy International advocacy director Edin Omanovic said technology firms and contractors use this  “guard of secrecy” to hide “what the actual problems are, how they sold their systems, what kind of meetings they had in the background, so we can’t, as a democratic populace, assess what went wrong”.

According to Privacy International’s Antonella Napolitano, pushing for transparency becomes even harder from “the moment you involve private actors, even in terms of Freedom of Information and other things you can do for accountability, it’s much more difficult to get that information when a private actor is involved”.

She adds, in line with Bendinelli’s comments, that while the government will speak publicly about pouring money into new technologies or border monitoring partnerships with France, “we don’t know about the practicality of it and how they actually use it – all you hear is about the money and about the ‘fantastic’ new tech”.

She further adds: “Despite all these resources, we are seeing more emphasis on how they are used to surveil and potentially prosecute people crossing the Channel, rather than to save lives.”

For Molnar, the prominence of public-private partnerships in the UK’s border regime are significant because of the state’s reliance on “problematic actors” that are not subject to the same level of scrutiny. “The fact is, a state or public administration of any sort often requires a private partner to be able to roll out the drones, the AI, whatever technology you’re talking about,” she says.

“And yet there is a very different legal regime of responsibility that accrues when you’re talking about a public entity versus a private entity, and then it really creates this obfuscatory grey area of responsibility.”

Molnar adds that because of the impetus by the state to use technology to strengthen its borders, private actors are able to pitch problematic technologies as a solution, with very little public scrutiny.

“It creates this kind of feedback loop where, at the end of the day, it’s about the bottom line of private sector companies, and not about the human rights of people who are crossing borders in the first place.”